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Detecting Adversarial Examples via Key-based
Network
Pinlong Zhao, Zhouyu Fu, Ou wu, Qinghua Hu, and Jun Wang
Abstract—Though deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance in visual classification, recent studies have
shown that they are all vulnerable to the attack of adversarial examples. Small and often imperceptible perturbations to the input
images are sufficient to fool the most powerful deep neural networks. Various defense methods have been proposed to address this
issue. However, they either require knowledge on the process of generating adversarial examples, or are not robust against new
attacks specifically designed to penetrate the existing defense. In this work, we introduce key-based network, a new detection-based
defense mechanism to distinguish adversarial examples from normal ones based on error correcting output codes, using the binary
code vectors produced by multiple binary classifiers applied to randomly chosen label-sets as signatures to match normal images and
reject adversarial examples. In contrast to existing defense methods, the proposed method does not require knowledge of the process
for generating adversarial examples and can be applied to defend against different types of attacks. For the practical black-box and
gray-box scenarios, where the attacker does not know the encoding scheme, we show empirically that key-based network can
effectively detect adversarial examples generated by several state-of-the-art attacks.
Index Terms—adversarial example, neural network, defence, key-based network.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
V Isual classification is particulary important in many ap-plications [1] and deep neural networks have achieved
state-of-the-art performance [2]. Despite their effectiveness
for classification tasks, recent research showed that main-
stream deep neural networks are all vulnerable to the attack
of adversarial examples [3], [4], [5], [6]. Specifically, very
small and often imperceptible perturbations to the input
images are sufficient to fool the most powerful deep neural
network models and result in incorrect classification.
The vulnerability to adversarial inputs can be problem-
atic and even prevent the application of deep learning meth-
ods in safety- and security-critical applications. The problem
is particularly severe when human safety is involved.
To improve the robustness against adversarial examples
for the deep neural networks, several defense methods
have been proposed based on augmenting the training data
with adversarial examples [3], [4], detecting the adversarial
examples [7], [8], modifying either the input examples [9]
or the network architecture [10]. However, they either re-
quire knowledge on the process of generating adversarial
examples [3], [4], [7], or are not robust against new attacks
specifically designed to penetrate the existing defense [11]
[12].
In this paper, we propose key-based network, a novel
defense method based on the detection of adversarial exam-
ples from normal input. Unlike existing detection-based de-
fense methods [7], [8] that leverage intermediate layer repre-
sentations of the trained model for learning a binary classi-
fication model to distinguish between adversarial examples
and normal images and thus require both adversarial and
normal input data for the detection task, the proposed key-
• Pinlong Zhao, Ou Wu, Qinghua Hu and Jun wang are with Tianjin Uni-
versity, E-mail: {pinlongzhao, wuou, huqinghua, jun.wang}@tju.edu.cn
• Zhouyu Fu is with Microsoft Research Asia, E-mail: zhofu@microsoft.com
based network does not specifically train a binary classifier
to detect adversarial examples and only requires normal
examples in training. Inspired by the error-correcting output
code framework [13], key-based network trains multiple
binary classifiers for randomly selected pairs of label subsets
and encodes each class with a binary code vector based on
the expected output for all individual classifiers. The binary
encoding for each class can be viewed as a unique signature
for the class and used to match normal examples and reject
adversarial examples based on their output codes.
The main contributions in this paper are as follows:
First, unlike previous detection methods in [7], [8], our
proposed method requires normal examples only to train
the detector and does not need to know the process of
generating adversarial examples. Hence it can detect ad-
versarial examples generated by different attacks. Second,
one needs to know the exact encoding scheme to break our
defense. However, the encoding schemes in the key-based
network are randomly chosen and the number of potential
schemes grows exponentially with increasing number of
classes. This makes it very hard to devise new attacks to
evade the detection of our method. Lastly, our method does
not rely on the network architecture and can be used to
protect a wide range of neural networks. Compared with
the original network, key-based network suffers minimal
accuracy loss on normal images, and can effectively detect
adversarial examples.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the preliminaries required to
further elaborate on our defense method. These include
definitions employed in this study, three mainstream adver-
sarial attacks used in the experiments.
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2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Examples
Normal examples are all the examples from the original data
set.
Adversarial examples are crafted by attackers using
normal examples. They are perceptually close to normal
examples but cause misclassification in the classifier.
2.1.2 Networks
Original networks are trained with all the normal examples
in the training set.
Key-based networks are also trained with the normal
examples and used to detect adversarial examples. Key-
based networks share the same structure as the correspond-
ing original networks and only differ in the logits layer and
softmax layer, as shown in Figure 1.
2.2 Generating adversarial examples
2.2.1 Fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
Given a normal image x, FGSM [4] looks for a similar image
x′ in the L∞ neighborhood of x that fools the classifier. Let
θ be the parameters of a model, x be the input example, y
be the target label and Loss(θ, x, y) be the cost associated
with assigning label y to example x for the trained model.
The adversarial example x′ can be obtained by maximizing
the loss w.r.t. the input image x in the local neighborhood of
x. This leads to the following update rule:
x′ = ProjBr(x)(x+ sign(∇xLoss(θ, x, y))) (1)
where  is the step size, and Proj is the projection operator
that maps the perturbed image to the L∞ neighborhood
of input x defined by Br(x) = {y : ‖y − x‖∞≤r}. Note
an approximate gradient is sufficient for adversarial attack,
hence the sign of the gradient is used in the above equation
due to efficiency concerns.
2.2.2 Deepfool
FGSM is a one-step attack method. It can be enhanced with
iterative attack techniques by repeatedly applying one-step
attacks. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [5] proposed such an attack
algorithm namely Deepfool through the iterative lineariza-
tion of the classifier to generate minimal perturbations that
are sufficient to change classification labels. The basic idea is
to find the closest decision boundary from a normal image
x in the image space, and then to cross that boundary to
fool the classifier. Since it is hard to solve this problem
directly in the high-dimensional and highly non-linear space
in neural networks, it instead solves this problem iteratively
with linearized approximations.
At each iteration, the classifier is linearized arround the
intermediate x′, and the optimal update direction is ob-
tained on this linearized model. Then x will update a small
step α in this direction. Finally an adversarial example will
be obtained by repeatedly linearizing the update process
until x′ crosses the decision boundary. The L∞ version of
the deep fools attack is used in this paper.
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Figure 1: The original and the key-based network: The upper
part of the figure is the original network, and the lower part
is the key-based network. The dashed boxes indicate that
they have the same structure.
2.2.3 Carlini’s attack
Carlini and Wagner recently introduced a powerful attack
that makes the perturbations quasi-imperceptible by re-
stricting their L2, L∞ and L0 norms [11]. For a fixed input
image x, the attack looks for a perturbation δ that is small in
length,satisfies the box constraints to be a valid image, and
fools the classifier at the same time.
In Carlini’s attack, there is a hyper-parameter called
confidence. Higher confidence produces adversarial exam-
ples with larger distortion, but more strongly classified as
adversarial.
For this paper, we use the untargeted L2 version of
Carlini’s attack.
2.3 Adversarial attacking scenarios
All three attacks discussed in the previous subsection as-
sumes the standard white-box attacking scenario, where
the network structure and weights are known to the at-
tacker. In contrast, for black-box attacks, the attacker has
no knowledge on either the structure or the weights of the
network to be attacked. This however gives no guarantee
of security. Since different deep neural networks used in
visual classification produce highly similar feature maps, it
is always possible to train a surrogate network with the
same dataset to simulate the original network. One can
then launch effective adversarial attacks on the surrogate
network instead [6] [14].
We focus on defense against gray-box attacks in this
paper. In a gray-back attack, the attacker knows both the
original network and the defense algorithm. Only the pa-
rameters of the defense model are hidden from the attacker.
This is also a standard setting assumed in many security
systems and applications [15].
3 KEY-BASED NETWORK
In this section, we introduce key-based network. First, we
discuss the main design of key-based network motivated
by core ideas from cryptography. We then review the error-
correcting output codes scheme that motives the proposed
encoding scheme. Finally, we discuss the robustness of
key-based network and highlight its differences from the
standard gradient obfuscation based methods for defense.
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3.1 Design of Key-Based Network
A major issue with existing defenses is their robustness,
mainly due to the lack of enough random factors in their
design, making it possible for the attackers to infer the
structure and parameters of the defense model and launch
new attacks to penetrate existing defenses using surrogate
networks [?].
To enable effective defenses against adversarial exam-
ples in the gray-box scenario, we need to increase the space
of design parameters for the defense model and choose a
random design parameter to achieve improved robustness.
This is akin to the design of a cryptographical system, where
we can view the defense model as the encryption algorithm,
and the design parameters as the secret keys. The algorithm
itself is not a secret. Only the keys are held secret, but there
are exponential number of possible key values to choose
from. Without knowing the exact key, there is no way to
break the encryption algorithm [13].
This motivates the key-based network for defending
against adversarial examples. Since an attacker needs to
know the label of an input example so as to maximize the
loss of the true label, we treat labels as the equivalent plain-
text to be protected. To this end, we devise an encryption
scheme to encode each output label with a corresponding
code vector. Formally, given an image x with ground truth
y, we have:
c = eθ(y), ∀c ∈ C
y = e−1θ (c), ∀c ∈ C
(2)
where c is the code vector for class y, eθ is the encryption
function that maps label y to code vector c, and e−1θ is the
decryption function that maps c to y, θ is the parameter of
the encryption function.
Since the encryption scheme defined above creates a one-
to-one correspondence between labels and the code vectors
they map to, it is possible to learn a network to fit input
x to the code vector c. In contrast, the original network
learns a model to directly predict label y. Figure 1 shows
the architectures of the original network and the key-based
network. The hidden layers of key-based network have the
same structure as the original network. The modification is
in the output layer and the loss function layer (for training
only), where the original network maps the output feature
vector to logits of m classes, and key-based network maps
the output feature vector to the corresponding code vector.
We can treat the original network as the special case where
the encryption function is a one-hot encoding function that
maps a discrete label to a one-hot vector.
For classification network, the following cross entropy is
usually employed as the loss function:
L = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(yj(xi) logfj(xi)) (3)
where n is the size of the batch size. y is an indicator vector
that the only non-zero element corresponds to the correct
class, yj is jth component of y.
For key-based layer training, we employ the squared loss
to measure the discrepancy between the output and code
values:
L = − 1
n
1
t
n∑
i=1
t∑
j=1
(fj(xi)− c−1j (yi))2 (4)
where c−1j (yi) is jth component of c
−1(yi).
With key-based network, we can view code vector c as
the signature for label y. This leads to a natural strategy
to detect adversarial examples, by verifying whether the
code vector computed from the input example matches
the signature of any class within certain precision level. If
the output code vector does not match any signature, the
corresponding input is treated as the adversarial example.
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Figure 2: There is a one-to-one match between each code
and each category. The left table is a code table, and each
line represents a different code. In particular, this is a 7-bit
code. There are 27 different codes. The table on the right
indicates that there are 11 cases: 10 different classes, and
the adversarial examples. Through key, the plaintext (code)
can be transformed into a plaintext (the corresponding
category).
3.2 Encoding Scheme of Key-Based Network
We used a lookup table to implement the encryption func-
tion in Equation (1), by mapping each label directly to a code
vector. The encoding scheme is essential for the security of
the detection algorithm. An example is shown in Figure 2,
where the lookup table is a matrix composed by stacking
the code vectors for each label class in rows. Each column
defines a binary classification problem by treating labels
corresponding to value of 1 as the positive class and labels
with value of 0 as the negative class. This connects key-
based network to the error correcting output codes (ECOC)
framework [13] for multi-class classification problem. ECOC
includes the one-vs-all scheme as a special case, which is
essentially the case of an identity matrix for the lookup table
and has been exclusively used in visual classification.
To make the encoding scheme elusive for the attacker to
break it, we use randomly generated code vector for each
class. For a m-class classification problem, there is a total
of 2m−1− 1 different assignment of binary problems for the
encoding scheme as equivalent to the columns of the lookup
table, excluding all 1 and all 0 assignments and mirrored
assignments obtained by swapping the labels. Hence the
complexity of testing for the right encoding scheme to break
the defense algorithm grows exponentially with the number
of classes, making it infeasible for the attacker to penetrate
the system.
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Note though we describe and employ binary encoding
scheme here, key-based network defines a broad frame-
work and can virtually incorporate with different types of
encodings, such as n-way (n > 2) or k-bit (k > 1) encoding
for each entry in the lookup table. This leads to multi-class
classification for each column and is likely to boost the
strength of defense albeit at the cost of complexity.
(a) (b)
Normal example
Adversarial example
Figure 3: Illustration of how gradient masking method and
key-based network method are different in a 2-D sample
space. We represent the boundary by orange curve. The
arrow indicates sensitive direction.
3.3 Robustness of Key-Based Network
Our method is based on attackers’ ignorance of key-based
layer’s parameters and key. First, the network parameters of
key-based layer are not known by attackers, as long as we
do not release its internal states. Attackers know the output
classes of network, the network’s structure and parameters
of network except for key-based layer. Second, an attacker
can hardly guess the exact code when he doesn’t know the
key.
Although our method has the same characteristics as
gradient masking: the attacker can not access to the gra-
dient, our method is quite different from gradient masking.
Figure 3 shows a simple example to illustrate the difference
between key-based network method and gradient masking
method. For an input x, the attacker’s purpose is to find
a small enough perturbation , so that x and x +  are on
different sides of the boundary (changing the classification
result). The direction which from x to x+ is called sensitive
directions. Inputs that make a small change in this direction
can lead to misclassification. Gradient masking does not
expose these directions to defend adversarial examples, but
these directions still exist. These directions can be discov-
ered by black-box attack method [14]. For the key-based
network, due to the change of the input to output mapping,
the boundary also changes, resulting in a change of sensitive
direction. As shown in Figure 3, attackers can not know
the exact sensitive direction. Therefore, this method can
effectively defend against adversarial examples.
4 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate key-based network,
using the MNIST [16] dataset for hand-written digit recog-
nition. First, we show that adversarial examples can be
detected with our proposed method for all three popular
attacks discussed in Section 2.2. We then examine the effect
of code lenghts on the detection performance. Finally, we
empirically evaluate why key-based network is effective.
4.1 Experiment Setup
4.1.1 Dataset Description
The MNIST dataset comprises a training set of 60,000
grayscale images of handwritten digits, and a test set of
10,000 images. Each image represents one of the 10 digits
from 0 to 9 with a resolution of 28*28 pixels.
4.1.2 Evaluation Criterion
We employ two metrics, namely predictive accuracy and de-
tection rate, to evaluate the performance of the proposed key
based network. Predictive accuracy is defined for normal
images as the ratio of correctly classified normal examples
to all normal examples. For key-based network, an example
is correctly classified if and only if the output code matches
exactly the signature of the ground truth class. Predictive
accuracy measures how well the modified network can
deal with normal examples. Detection rate is defined for
adversarial images as the ratio of adversarial examples
correctly detected by key based network to the total number
of adversarial examples generated. Ideally, we would expect
the proposed method to achieve very high detection rate
without losing much predictive accuracy as compared to
the deep neural network trained with standard method.
Input
Output
(28x28) (64x14x14) (128x5x5) (128x1x1) (10) (10)
Convolutional 
layer(8x8)
Convolutional 
layer(6x6)
Convolutional 
layer(5x5)
Fully connected 
layer
Softmax 
layer
Figure 4: The baseline model.
4.1.3 Architecture of Baseline Network
We used the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) in Fig-
ure 4 as the baseline model for the classification task. It
contains three convolutional layers with RELU activation
function for each layer, a fully connected layer, and a soft-
max layer as an output. We will evaluate a variety of other
models in Section 4.4 to demonstrate the effectiveness of key
based network.
4.2 Adverarial Example Detection
We first show that key based network can effectively detect
adversarial examples generated by three popular attacks,
namely FGSM, DeepFool and Carlini’s attack. We first use
all training examples in the MNIST dataset to train the
baseline network shown in Figure 4. Then the output layer
and the softmax loss layer of the trained baseline network
were replaced with key-based layer and the squared loss
layer to retrain the model so as to obtain the key-based
network for the detection of adversarial examples.
In the testing process, we first gain the predictive accu-
racies on 10,000 normal test examples for both the baseline
network and key-based network. We then generate adver-
sarial examples from test images correctly classified by the
baseline network using each of the three above-mentioned
attacks and verify if the adversarial examples generated by
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TABLE 1
(a) Accuracy on normal examples
Baseline Knet
99.25% 98.62%
(b) Detection rate on adversarial examples
Attack Parameter Fooling Rate Detection Rate
FGSM =0.2 49.60% 96.26%
FGSM =0.3 88.52% 99.31%
DeepFool 99.35% 97.83%
Carlini κ=0.0 100.0% 95.66%
Carlini κ=0.1 100.0% 94.86%
Carlini κ=0.2 100.0% 94.14%
these different attacks can be correctly detected by the key-
based network. An adversarial example is detected correctly
if either it can be detected as an adversarial example or it can
be classified correctly by the modified network.
The results are reported in Table 1, where Table 1a shows
the accuracies of the baseline model and key-based network
on normal test examples, and Table 1b shows the detection
rate of key-based network on adversarial test examples gen-
erated by different attacks, along with the fooling rates of
the generated adversarial examples for the baseline model.
The results indicate that the key-based network achieves
comparable predictive performance with the baseline net-
work, but is much more robust to adversarial examples
and can successfully defend against all adversarial attacks
we tested. With only 0.6% drop in accuracy, the proposed
method achieves a detection rate of over 94% for Carlini’s
attack, which is able to achieve 100% fooling rate for the
baseline model. The detection rate achieve for FGSM and
Deepfool is even high and can reach 99% for FGSM. On the
other hand, even for the weakest FGSM attack, the baseline
model can still be fooled by half of the adversarial examples.
4.3 Effect of Code Lengths on Detection Performance
In the next experiment, we examine how the length of the
output code affects the performance of key-based network.
We train and test our network with code lengths of 5, 10,
20, 30, 40, 50 and 60, respectively. The results are shown in
Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Figure 5 shows the changes in predictive accuracies for
normal examples with different code lengths. The longer
the code, the lower the accuracy is, though the reduction
in accuracy is quite small. With the code length changing
from 5 to 60, the predictive accuracy drops from 98.7% to
97.7%. Figure 6 shows the changes in detection rates for
adversarial examples. For all the three attacks, the detection
rate improves with increasing length of codes. When the
length of code is larger than 40, the detection rate exceeds
97% for all three attacks. The reason is the larger the code
length, the harder it is to decipher the exact code, and hence
the more secure the key-based network is.
Overall, it can be seen that the performance of key-
based network is not sensitive to the choice of code lengths
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Figure 5: The accuracy on different code lengths.
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Figure 6: Detection rate of different code lengths.
provided a sufficiently long code is used. The performance
is quite stable over a wide range of code lengths with no
evidence of sudden drop in accuracy or boost in detection
rate with increasing code lengths.
4.4 Empirically analysis on the Effectiveness
In the last experiment, we provide an empirical analysis
on the effectiveness of the proposed key-based network
by examining its performance overlap with the baseline
model. To enable a more thorough comparison, in addition
to the baseline network shown in Figure 4, we have trained
three other baseline networks on the same training set of
60,000 images with different architectures, namely baseline2,
baseline3, baseline4. Table 2 shows the architectures of these
networks. We first apply the trained networks, include the
four baseline models and key-based network, to 10,000
test examples with randomly generated pixel values in the
range of [0, 1]. The number of times that the output labels
produced by the baseline2-4 models and key-based network
overlap with the output labels of the baseline network are
calculated and the result is shown in Table 3a. We then
repeat the same test for normal test images with random
noises. 100 images were randomly sampled from 10,000 test
images. For each image, we apply 100 different random
noise patterns by independently adding a pixelwise uniform
random noise in the range [−0.5, 0.5] and clipping the result
to [0, 1] range. This also leads to 10,000 test examples for the
second test. The result on overlapping prediction labels is
shown in Table 3b.
From the results in Table 3, it can be seen that though
the architectures of baseline2, baseline3, baseline4 networks
are all different from the baseline network, their prediction
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TABLE 2: Network with different architectures
(a) Baseline2
size stride padding
Conv.ReLU 8*8 (64) 2*2 same 14*14*64
Conv.ReLU 6*6 (128) 2*2 valid 5*5*128
Conv.ReLU 5*5 (128) 1*1 valid 1*1*128
FullyConnect 10 100
FullyConnect 10 10
Softmax 10 10
(b) Baseline3
size stride padding
Conv.ReLU 3*3 (64) 2*2 same 14*14*64
Conv.ReLU 3*3 (128) 2*2 valid 6*6*128
Conv.ReLU 5*5 (128) 1*1 valid 1*1*128
FullyConnect 10 100
FullyConnect 10 200
FullyConnect 10 10
Softmax 10 10
(c) Baseline4
size stride padding
Conv.ReLU 3*3 (128) 2*2 valid 13*13*128
Conv.ReLU 5*5 (128) 2*2 valid 6*6*128
FullyConnect 10 100
FullyConnect 10 10
Softmax 10 10
TABLE 3
(a) Random inputs
Baseline2 Baseline3 Baseline4 Knet
4826 5748 3763 0
(b) Normal examples with random noise
Baseline2 Baseline3 Baseline4 Knet
9807 9663 9373 1948
results have a very high overlapping ratio for random in-
puts and images imposed with random noises. This reveals
highly correlated input-output mappings learned by these
baseline models despite their differences in the architecture,
and suggests the great chance on the success of tranfer
attacks to break the baseline system. On the other hand,
the overlapping in prediction labels is very low between
key-based network and the baseline model, which suggests
potentially different mappings learned by the two networks.
Therefore, the adversarial examples generated by other net-
works can hardly be transferred to key-based network.
5 CONCLUSION
Detecting adversarial examples is one of defenses against
adversarial examples. While this method does not directly
allow classifying adversarial examples correctly, it allows
mitigating adversarial attacks against machine learning sys-
tems by resorting to fallback solutions. However, prior work
in detecting adversarial examples requires knowledge of
adversarial examples. Thus, the defense is specific to the
process for generating those adversarial examples. In this
paper, we proposed key-based network, a framework for
detecting adversarial examples. Key-based network learns
to detect adversarial examples without requiring knowledge
of adversarial examples, which leading to better generaliza-
tion in different attacks. Experiments show that key-based
network can detect the popular attacks effectively, while
suffers minimal accuracy loss on normal examples. Future
work should investigate the impact of key-based network
on other DNN models and adversarial examples crafting
algorithms.
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